Introduction
The Lexical Constructional Model or LCM is a comprehensive model of meaning construction through language in context. The reader may find two complementary descriptions of the model in Ruiz de and Mairal & Ruiz de Mendoza (2009) . Some examples of work within different areas of the LCM are Jiménez & Pérez (2008) and , for lexical representation, Peña (2009) , Baicchi (2011) and Galera & Ruiz de Mendoza (2012) , Ruiz de Mendoza & Gonzálvez (2011a) , for argument structure issues, and Del Campo (2011), Ruiz de Mendoza & Gonzálvez (2011b) and , for illocution. Critical overviews of the LCM are provided in Butler (2009 Butler ( , 2012 .
The LCM makes use of descriptive and explanatory tools from other linguistic accounts.
Among them, the following figure prominently: (i) functionalist approaches such as Functional Grammar (FG; Dik, 1997ab) , Systemic Functional Grammar (SFG; Halliday & Matthiessen, 2004) , and Role and Reference Grammar (RRG; Van Valin & LaPolla, 1997; Van Valin, 2005) ; (ii) cognitive linguistics (CL), especially the Lakoffian strand of Cognitive Semantics (Lakoff, 1987; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999 ) and Goldberg's Construction Grammar (CxG; Goldberg, 1995 Goldberg, , 2006 ; (iii) Natural Semantic Metalanguage (NSM; Wierzbicka, 1996 Wierzbicka, , 1999 Goddard and Wierzbicka, 1994, 2002) and Explanatory and Combinatorial Lexicology (ECL; Mel'cuk, 1989; Mel'cuk & Wanner, 1996) . However, the LCM does not fully identify itself with any of these approaches or other postulates within the functionalist and cognitivist 1 Center for Research In the Applications of Language, University of La Rioja. The research on which this paper is based has received financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, grant no. FFI 2010-17610/FILO. camps. Thus, while it is willing to make use of analytical resources coming from these and other fields of linguistic enquiry (especially from cognitive and functional linguistics, pragmatics, discourse theory and the cognitive sciences in general), it only does so to the extent that such resources prove effective to account for meaning construction and interpretation and for the formal realization of conceptual structure.
Furthermore, the LCM has built its own set of tools for linguistic description and explanation.
In the domain of description, four meaning construction layers or levels are distinguished: level 1 deals with basic predicate-argument relationships and the way they are put into different perspectives in terms of tense, aspect and modality; levels 2 and 3 respectively address non-illocutionary and illocutionary (constructional or implicational) structure; finally, level 4 is concerned with discourse structure. In the domain of linguistic explanation, the LCM specifies the conditions for the integration of level-internal and level-external structure plus the conditions for the activation of implicit conceptual structure.
At whatever level of description, the LCM contemplates the complementariness of inferential and non-inferential meaning construction processes. Inferential meaning construction is supported by the activity of representational cognitive operations (RCOs) on cognitive models or on meaning representations at any level of meaning construction. An RCO is a mental mechanism whose purpose is to derive a full semantic representation out of a linguistic expression (or of other symbolic device, such as a drawing) in order to make it fully meaningful in the context in which it is to be interpreted. RCOs work in isolation or in combination on cognitive models of different types thus giving rise to predictable kinds of meaning effect. They are thus different from other cognitive operations whose role is to store and retrieve memories and information, or to recognize and/or construe objects, events or situations. A detailed account of RCOs is found in Ruiz de Mendoza & Pérez (2003) , Ruiz de Mendoza & Peña (2005) , and Ruiz de Mendoza (2011). Non-inferential meaning construction is based on lexical-constructional integration at level 1 of the LCM and on the instantiation of constructional variables at levels 2, 3 and 4 with lower-level representations (see section 5.1).
Within this descriptive and explanatory context, the purpose of this chapter is to provide readers with a description of the constructional apparatus of the LCM and of the way in which it is put to use in conveying meaning through language. As we proceed in our account, we will make contrasts with other cognitivist and functionalist accounts of language where the notion of construction plays a relevant theoretical role, especially Goldberg's CxG (Goldberg, 1995 (Goldberg, , 2006 and Van Valin's (2005) RRG. symbolic assembly involved in the intransitive sentence She usually weeps at funerals, where we know that the protagonist is a female person that has the habit of weeping when she is at a funeral. However, contrast She wept her soul away during the funeral. There are some small problems for full compositionality to be postulated for this sentence. One is that weeping is an intransitive verb, so it cannot have an object. A second problem has to do with composing the meaning of weep away. It can be argued that away is a polysemous adverb one of whose meanings evokes the idea of 'completeness', so weep away would mean 'weep to the limit of her strength or ability'. However, this brings in one more problem, i.e. that of how to interpret soul, which could be a metonymy for a person's emotions and her inner strength. But it would not work in the same way to say She wept her emotions away. In other cases of metonymy, the substitution of the intended referent for the one given by the expression seems to be more felicitous: The buses/the bus drivers are on strike; We need a new hand/worker on our farm.
These two examples of metonymy are not a problem for compositionality. It could be argued that soul combines with weep away in roughly the same way as heart combines with break in She broke my heart, where 'heart' stands for feelings. Since feelings cannot be physically broken but non-physically hurt, this situation calls for an analysis in terms of metaphor and metonymy in combination: the heart with its associated feelings is seen as an object that can be broken and breaking the speaker's heart is seen as hurting his feelings (cf. Ruiz de Mendoza & Díez, 2002) . However, this solution cannot be carried over to the analysis of weep away in the sentence above for two reasons: one is that here there is real weeping while in 'break someone's heart' there is no real breaking; the other is that weeping is seen as the manner in which another unmentioned action is carried out (i.e. releasing emotional tension).
In view of this discussion, what all these problems boil down to is the need to deal with the sentence She wept her soul away during the funeral mostly in non-compositional terms. In order come up with the best possible explanation, we first need to consider the meaning implications of the sentence. The most relevant ones for our discussion are:
(i) The protagonist wept abundantly.
(ii) By weeping the protagonist released most, if not all, her emotional tension (i.e. there is a change of state).
(iii) The protagonist's weeping lasted at least from the beginning to the end of the funeral.
While implication (iii) can be derived compositionally from the combination of the "during" PP and the rest of the sentence, (i) and (ii) need a different explanation. So, our second step is to see if these two meaning implications may arise from a meaning pattern associated to some formal expression mechanism. This is easy to do by finding other linguistic expressions where the configuration V + O + away captures a similar range of meaning implications (cf. Jackendoff, 1997 sample of realizations is enough to identify a productive pattern that preserves implications similar to those in (i) and (ii) above: there is an explicit action (e.g. crying, drinking, sleeping, singing, etc.) which takes place for a long time thus being instrumental for another resultative action or process to take place in its entirety (e.g. releasing tensions or emotions, alleviating sorrows, having leisure time in order to feel better). These implications act as constraints on the elements that can realize the verb and object formal parts of the pattern: not any verb and object are possible, but only verbs involving ways of releasing emotional tension and objects denoting the relevant emotion directly, metonymically or through other conceptual connections (e.g. frame structure; cf. Fillmore, 1982) . Evidently, there is a non-compositional productive association between the formal configuration V + O + away and the 'manner of releasing emotional-tension' meaning described above, where the meaning characterization places constraints on the kind of elements that can realize each form item. Because of this nature, we can safely argue for the constructional status of such a form-meaning pairing.
This discussion brings us to the definition of the notion of construction. There are three crucial properties of constructions that we have highlighted so far: (i) a construction is a formmeaning pairing where form consists of a morphosyntactic arrangement of elements; (ii) the form-meaning pairing needs to be productive, i.e. it gives rise to a pattern whose formal part can be realized by predicates that obey the requirements of the meaning part of the pairing; (iii) the nature of the relationship between the form and the meaning part is bi-univocal: form cues for meaning and meaning is realized by form.
There is one more property of constructions that has not come up in our discussion as yet. As we mentioned above, in recent cognitive-linguistic accounts it is assumed that frequency is a valid criterion to assign constructional status to a form-meaning pairing. On the face of it, this criterion may look like a valid one, but it is faced with two problems. First, we may wonder how frequency is to be measured. According to Bybee (2006) , this is simply an empirical question that will be solved with time, as more phenomena are identified and low, medium and high frequency ranges specified for them. However, one objection to Bybee's reaction to the problem is precisely that setting up upper and lower limits on each frequency range is in itself an arbitrary decision. In fact, frequency will vary with the usefulness of a construction to convey meaning within certain contexts. The greater the amount of times that a given situation type occurs, the greater the likelihood of occurrence for constructions related to that context. Other variables that can affect the frequency of a construction are the social context, register, gender, and age. A construction can have very low frequency on the basis of situational and other contextual factors and still be recognizable by speakers as well formed and meaningful. Besides, what if a form-meaning pairing is produced only once by a communicatively competent native speaker and not only understood but also regarded as highly natural output by other equally competent native speakers within a community of speakers? Would that not be a construction? If such a form-meaning pairing could qualify as a construction, then we need a different criterion than frequency.
Within the LCM, we contend that frequency is a natural side-effect of a form-meaning pairing catching on within a community of speakers for a given communicative purpose within a given context. The LCM proposes replicability as a more realistic criterion to determine whether a form-meaning pairing can be regarded as a construction. A construction is replicable to the extent that it can be understood as meaningful and reproduced with minimum (i.e. immaterial) variation by other competent speakers of the same language to convey the same meaning implications within similar context types. Replicability is thus to be added to properties (i)-(iii) above. In sum, the LCM defines a construction as a form-meaning (or function) pairing where form affords access to meaning and meaning is realized by form to the extent that such processes have become entrenched in the speaker's mind and are generally recognized by competent speakers of the language in question to be stably associated or are at least potentially replicable by other competent speakers of the same language with immaterial variation in its form and meaning.
Mediated compositionality
Now, let us go back to compositionality. Langacker (1987 Langacker ( , 2000 seems to be in favor of recognizing that some form-meaning pairings cannot be constructed on the basis of compositionality thus requiring a constructional treatment. But if an expression can be explained compositionally, it is not necessary to postulate an extra level of meaning description. A relatively similar position is held in Van Valin's (2005) The existence of different kinds of transitive use and logical structure associated with twoplace verbal predicates not only points in the direction of a highly abstract notion of transitivity, as we have defended above, but also suggests that it is necessary to endow lexical-predicate meaning structure with world-knowledge components. Additionally, it draws a picture of how meaning is constructed that differs from the one given by projectionist, compositional and constructionist accounts. In the LCM, there is projection of enriched lexical meaning (i.e. lexical meaning that binds world knowledge meaning elements with event-structure meaning) through constructional meaning into syntax. That is, lexical meaning elements are combined with one another through the mediation of constructional meaning. As we will see later on, this process is a constrained one: some combinations are made possible while others are discarded on the grounds of a number of conditions that regulate the interaction between lexical and constructional meaning. This means, for example, that the meaning of The blacksmith hammered the metal is composed by incorporating the meaning and argument structure of hammer into the transitive construction, which requires two arguments, one that acts as the object or target of the other's eventive experience. The object in this case is the metal and the other argument is an actor within the eventive experience of hammering the metal.
In this view of mediated compositionality, meaning is not necessarily constructed either bottom-up or top-down, since in actual use speakers can combine the two strategies or opt for one or the other depending on personal styles or on their online reaction to specific communicative situations. By way of illustration, consider the different levels of meaning construction involved in I would never ignore your advice, much less break your rules. The context for this utterance is one where the speaker feels the hearer is upset because the speaker has broken the hearer's rules and disregarded his advice. The speaker's choice of the construction with "much less" is strategic for the speaker to alleviate the hearer's emotional distress by reassuringly placing himself in a submissive, fully compliant position. So, on pragmatic grounds, it is very likely that the construction X Much Less Y, which calls for a contrast between 'ignoring the hearer's advice' and 'breaking the hearer's rules', is the first choice made by the speaker; other constructional options, such as the choice of I would never, which enhances the idea of submissiveness, would come second, while the expression of the two contrasting propositions would take the third place. In the LCM, the overall illocutionary intention for this utterance is a matter inferred illocution within a given illocutionary scenario type (cf. Ruiz de Mendoza & Baicchi, 2007; . The configuration X Much Less Y is used two achieve the overall illocutionary purpose, but its X and Y variables are constrained by some requirements: the situation described in X is not likely to happen and, in any event, it is less likely to occur than the situation depicted in Y.
This means that X and Y need to be negative statements, which is another illocutionary category. The configuration I Would Never VP is an illocutionary construction that serves this purpose. The VP variable in this construction is realized by the first argument-structure level complex combining the verb "ignore" and its object. Another contrasting VP fills in the Y variable of the initial discourse construction. This is a fully top-down strategy in the construction of a meaningful message for the context specified above: the speaker starts from an overall illocutionary intention and goes down the descriptive levels of discourse and local illocutionary structure up to argument-structure combinations. However, other meaning construction strategies are possible. For example, the speaker might have opted for one where he or she quickly reacts to the rule-breaking accusation and then, on another step, denies the accusation on the basis of a different discourse strategy: Break the rules? I would never do that! And I'd never ignore your advice either! Here the speaker first shows astonishment by repeating the more serious hearer's accusation with a questioning tone, then proceeds to deny it and finally decides to address the less serious accusation too. There is no initial discourse choice but rather the piecemeal construction of the overall discourse structure of the message through the sequential addition of discourse stretches each of which is consistent with the preceding one.
Finally, the LCM view of mediated compositionality also allows for meaning to be way that is consistent with our knowledge of the world. For example, when we ask people to tie their shoes, we understand that they will tie their shoelaces rather than any other part of their shoes to another object. The focus of attention is thus reduced from the shoes to the shoelaces. Conversely, the scope of attention can be expanded when we are cued to use part of a concept to access the whole. This is the case of the use of shoes to refer to a situation in which a person finds himself or herself, as in the sentence If I were in your shoes, I wouldn't go into business with him. Lexical metaphor, on the other hand, works by making us understand an item (or set of related conceptual items) as if it were another item (or set of items). For example, we can understand someone's cowardly behavior in terms of comparable behavior when a chicken, which is a weak animal, is frightened and runs away. Following this rationale, You are a chicken! does not simply mean 'You are a coward', but adds a number of extra meaning implications about the addressee's weakness, lack of self-confidence, and inability to rise up to challenging situations. It is this complex conceptual package, rather than just the idea of 'cowardice', that is brought into meaning composition.
Construction-based cueing takes place in a broader range of situations. First, since a construction is a form-meaning pairing, it follows that cueing can be directed to retrieve either formal or meaning elements. Formal structure retrieval happens in the case of ellipsis.
Consider: [Would I ever] break the rules? and [Can you] see what I mean?
In these two clauses the elided material, which is part of the formal pole of the construction, is obtained, together with its associated meaning, by finding compatible form elements that realize meaning that is consistent with the context of situation or with world-knowledge assumptions.
Constructional meaning structure retrieval can happen in three ways:
(i) Constructional presupposition: When did you stop beating your wife? inserts the implicit assertion that the addressee used to beat his wife into an egressive phrasal aspect construction X Stop Y).
(ii) Saturation or completion of underdetermined linguistic expressions (cf. Recanati, 1989; Bach, 1994; Sperber & Wilson, 1995) (iii) Subsentential utterances (Carston, 2002 (Carston, , 2004 , also called minor clauses (Halliday & Matthiessen, 2004) . Some examples are: Nice day; Morning!; A spider! Minor clauses have no verb or predicator and are used to realize conversational functions that draw attention to the speaker's emotions or attitude to a certain state of affairs (e.g.
exclaiming, calling, greeting). In meaning construction, the speaker-related overtones are added to the matter-of-fact description of a state of affairs on the basis of argumentstructure representations.
The picture of mediated meaning composition that we have presented here places the LCM midway between projectionist and constructionist accounts of language. However, this does not mean that the LCM takes any theoretical weight off the role of constructions in linguistic description and explanation. In fact, constructions are given a highly prominent place in the LCM, since they are present at all levels of description as a possible meaning construction pathway alternating and/or being complemented with inferential activity. Thus, lexical structure is always projected through constructional structure at the level of argument structure representations. Then, the output of this process is built into implicational, illocutionary and discourse constructions. In the following sections, we will deal with the role of constructions in this complex process at the descriptive and explanatory levels of adequacy.
Descriptive tools
As part of its descriptive apparatus, the LCM features:
(i) A typology of cognitive models, which it divides up into low-level and high-level situational and non-situational cognitive models (cf. Ruiz de Mendoza, 2007) . These models underlie not only the semantic base of lexical predicates and constructions but also language users' inferential ability, which is also an essential part of the dynamics of meaning construction. Furthermore, this typology determines the four descriptive levels of the LCM: the argument structure level or level 1; the implicational structure level or level 2; the illocutionary structure level or level 3; and the discourse structure level or level 4.
(ii) Predicate-structure and argument-structure constructional templates, initially inspired by analogous Aktionsart-based descriptive tools in RRG, but later developed into richer characterizations incorporating world knowledge through a combination of lexical primes and functions adapted from NSM and ECL.
(iii) Idiomatic configurations, which can range from having the nature of a lexical predicate (e.g. kick the bucket 'die') to that of a construction with variable elements (e.g. Can You X, Please?, used to make requests; or X Let Alone Y, used to contrast two unlikely situations or events where the second one is even less likely to take place than the first; cf. Fillmore, Kay & O'Connor 1988) .
Sections 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 discuss these descriptive constructs.
A typology of cognitive models
The LCM makes use of the notion of idealized cognitive model or ICM, first proposed by Lakoff (1987) , and recognizes ICMs as the repository of world knowledge, which is crucial not only to create a coherent discourse flow, as has been emphasized by text linguists and discourse analysts ever since the inception of their work (e.g. Beaugrande & Dressler, 1981; Van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983; cf. Trappes-Lomax, 2004: 150) , but also to account for all aspects of meaning construction, including mediated composition and cued inferencing. An ICM is an internally coherent conceptual structure arising from the way we construe the world of our experience. Lakoff (1987) At the primary level, we have knowledge constructs that arise directly from sensorimotor experience. Such constructs include but are not limited to image schemas, which the LCM defines as topological conceptual characterizations abstracted away from low-level conceptual structure arising from (i) the way we perceive objects by themselves and in their interaction with other objects, and (ii) from the way we interact with such objects on the basis of motor programs.
Low-level ICMs are non-topological knowledge constructs created on the basis of our experience with objects, situations, events and their properties and relations. Low-level cognitive models are schematizations of experience that can be enriched ad hoc as demanded by a number of cognitive tasks, such as recognition, memory retrieval, and various construal operations including those pertaining to language production and interpretation.
High-level ICMs are non-topological knowledge constructs created by deriving properties and relations common to low-level cognitive models. High-level cognitive models can be parametrized in application of the GENERIC FOR SPECIFIC metonymy.
Situational cognitive models or scenarios are conventional series of events (i.e. dynamic states of affairs) that are coherently related to one another. They are constructed on the basis of propositional cognitive models that combine to create more complex scenarios.
Non-situational cognitive models are those that capture information pertaining to entities, their properties and their relations in non-situational contexts.
Scalar cognitive models are primary cognitive models based on a system of ordered marks at fixed intervals that can be used as a reference standard in measurement. From this brief discussion of examples, it is evident that each descriptive level in the LCM is based on a different kind of world-knowledge structure that gives shape to the semantic pole of lexical and constructional characterizations:
-Level 1 lexical structure makes use of either primary or low-level non-situational
ICMs.
-Level 1 argument-structure constructions make use of high-level non-situational ICMs.
-Level 2 implicational constructions are based on low-level situational ICMs.
-Level 3 illocutionary constructions -Level 4 discourse constructions
As shown above, each of these ICM types can be used, within its level of description, to derive inferences.
Argument-structure lexical and constructional templates
In order to account for the eventive structure of lexical items that can act as predicators, the 
. Aktionsart characterizations in RRG
Each verb or its semantic and syntactic equivalent is described in terms of its logical structure.
However, there is more than just this characterization. The LCM has incorporated into its descriptive apparatus an enriched version of the original notion of lexical template in RRG. Van Valin & La Polla (1997: 117) give the following template for speech act verbs:
This template, which simply captures the idea that speech act verbs are used to perform actions by expressing meaning in language, can be further specified when applied to a specific speech act verb, as is the case of promise, which is seen as a causative accomplishment ( Van Valin & La Polla 1997: 551) :
This representation binds the logical (or Aktionsart) structure capturing the eventive nature of the lexical predicate in question (the speaker causes himself or herself to become obligated to a course of action) with the non-eventive idea that the predicate is used to convey meaning through language. However, the amount of conceptual material that is encoded into this representation is not sufficient to account for all the knowledge that is relevant in the case of 'promise': speakers making promises do more than just express self-imposed obligation; they are also able and willing to perform the action and they generally make promises in order to comply with the addressee's wishes or expectations in a reassuring way. This knowledge is necessary for linguistic interpretation: I promise to cancel the card if I don't find it in a few days strongly suggests that the hearer is worried about the card being misused by someone else if it has actually been lost rather than just misplaced. There is no way in which this (default) interpretation can be derived on the basis of Van Valin & La Polla's representation.
In order to solve problems like this, Mairal & Faber (2002 , 2005 , 2007 have proposed a system of capturing world knowledge through conceptual amalgams of lexical functions and conceptual primitives. Such amalgams can then be bound with logical structures like those put forward in RRG by correlating argument-structure variables (represented by Roman alphabet letters such as x, y, z) with the variables associated to specific world knowledge structure amalgams (represented by numerals like 1, 2, 3). The following representation captures essential world-knowledge structure described before for the verb promise:
[ø] CAUSE [BECOME obligated' (x, z)] x=1, y = 2, z = 3
A lexical function (e.g. MANNER, PURP) is an operator over lexical content, which can be broken down into amalgams of conceptual primitives and event-structure characterizations.
Lexical functions can also combine, as in LOC TEMP à FACT above. Lexical functions have been adapted from Mel'cuk's Explanatory and Combinatorial Lexicology (ECL) (cf.
Mel 'cuk, 1989; Mel'cuk & Wanner, 1996) , while conceptual primitives have been drawn from Wierzbicka's Natural Semantic Metalanguage because of its solid typological grounding (cf. Wierzbicka, 1999; Goddard and Wierzbicka, 1994, 2002) .
One of the areas of emphasis of the LCM is on grouping lexical items into lexical classes with the view of systematizing lexical description (cf. Faber & Mairal, 1999) . Consider the way in which this is done by looking into the conceptual structure of verbs meaning 'do something badly' such as the following:
spoil': do' (x, ø) CAUSE BECOME bad' (y) botch': <infml> do' (x, ø) CAUSE BECOME bad' (y)
The parameter of informality and the manner specification (a lexical function) are crucial to produce the correct representations. Botch and flub are informal ways of conveying the same meaning as spoil and bungle. In turn, the notion of ineptness associated with the manner of performing the action in the verbs bungle and flub is captured by the combination of primitives 'do_bad'.
Now we come to argument-structure constructional templates. We will devote this part of the present section to the meaning pole of constructions, while section 6 later on will outline the question of formal expression. The first aspect of constructions to note is that their semantic configuration makes use of the same descriptive metalanguage as lexical templates. This is a reasonable consequence of the fact that the semantic pole of argument-structure constructions -The first participant (which is realized as the syntactic subject) is prototypically human or it can be metonymically interpreted as such: The BBC wants the audience happy.
-The constructional element acting as a predicative complement of the object must be characterizing but not identifying: I want you happy/*Marilyn Monroe.
-The predicative complement must express the speaker's assessment: I want you happy/*tall. Consider now, by way of contrast, the features and representation of the declarative subjective-transitive construction:
-The first participant (which is realized as the syntactic subject) is prototypically human or it can be metonymically interpreted as such: The BBC considers this proposal viable.
-The constructional element acting as a predicative complement of the object must be characterizing but not identifying: He considers her a nice person/ * the woman sitting over there.
-The predicative complement must express the speaker's assessment: I consider her beautiful/ *in room 6.
Evidently, it differs from its sister manipulative construction in the lack of the manipulative ingredient. The rest of the properties coincide. Below is the template for the semantic pole of this construction, together with its paraphrase: This representation shares part of its eventive structure with the caused-motion construction, which is evident from the following template:
'The first participant acts in such a way that the first participant causes an entity to move to a new location'
The reader will by now be aware that the difference between argument-structure constructions and lexical-predicate descriptions is merely a matter of the greater degree of genericity of the former over the latter. What this means is that lexical structure is constructional, which is why it is ready to combine with non-lexical argument-structure characterizations to the extent that there is conceptual compatibility. The problem for the analyst is to determine the conditions for such compatibility. There are two sources of difficulty: one is the fact that lexical and constructional structure, as evident from the description of lexical and constructional templates, is complex, i.e. it binds conceptual-primitive amalgams modified by lexical functions with event structure specifications; the other is that conceptual compatibility can be overridden through event re-construal processes thus giving rise to a rich array of lexicalconstructional integration possibilities. Section 5 addresses these issues in some more detail.
We now turn our attention to idiomatic constructions.
Idiomatic constructions
Argument-structure constructions, like lexical-predicate configurations, are the building blocks of meaning construction. For this reason, they are basic to language production and interpretation. Sometimes, specific combinations of lexical and constructional structure of this kind become fixed through frequent repetition. This happens when the mediated meaning composition process is partially based on cued inferencing and the resulting inferences become stably associated with the overall combination. This is the origin of idiomatic constructions. These are fixed form-meaning pairings that range from predicate-argument configurations (e.g. kick the bucket 'die') to full clauses (e.g. An apple a day keeps the doctor away, used to advice people to eat healthy). The LCM classifies idiomatic constructions along two axes: (i) their degree of fixity, i.e. whether they are fully fixed or they contain some variable elements; (ii) their meaning function, which is essential to determine the level of description that they belong. 
g. All that glitters is not gold).
The second dimension is useful to distinguish implicational, illocutionary and discourse structure constructions, as briefly described in section 4.1, to which we add predicationalstructure idiomatic constructions. We give some examples below: that there is a situation that bothers or irritates the speaker. The situation results from some previous event that is described in the VP Y variable part. In the example given above, someone has left the bulletin board in a disordered condition, which is the consequence of someone inefficiently handling the notices on it. The VP component is necessarily a progressive form in order to complete the past perfect form of the fixed part, thus indicating that the action has taken place in the recent past and is of consequence to the present moment.
Summary
The overview of the descriptive levels of the LCM that has been given in the preceding subsections is summarized in figure 3 , for convenience. The bomb went off and three people were killed (cause-effect/ precedence)
Descripti

Fig. 3. The descriptive level in the LCM
Explanatory tools
At the explanatory level, the LCM postulates two basic meaning construction processes: one of them, cued inferencing or cueing, consists in the activation of implicit conceptual structure through some inferential mechanism on the basis of textual and contextual cues; the other is the integration of conceptual structure.
Cueing does not directly involve lexical or constructional structure, but the selective activation of conceptual structure organized in terms of an ICM type, as described in section 4.1. The intricacies of cueing, together with the principles that constrain its activity, go beyond the scope of the present paper. The interested reader may find a thorough account in Ruiz de Mendoza (2011). Here we will give one example of how cueing is constrained. For the sake of simplicity, consider an implicature-derivation task based on a hunting scenario, i.e. a low-level situational model specifying the typical characters, setting and sequences of actions arising from the activity of pursuing and usually killing game for food or sport.
Imagine a friend of the speaker's, Jim, has gone hunting with some friends. After the hunting event, the speaker comments Jim is a great shot with the intention of conveying the idea that the hunt was very successful. This kind of implication can be obtained on the basis of a chained premise-conclusion analysis:
Premise (implicit assumption): A great shot is likely to hit all his targets while hunting. The two chained reasoning schemas, from the perspective of cognitive operations, are grounded in metonymy. Through metonymic expansion, the idea that Jim has great skills as a hunter gives access to a more complex hunting scenario where Jim uses his skills to actually hit all his targets. This first metonymy is a case of ABILITY FOR ACTION. In turn, this richer action scenario, through metonymic reduction, provides access to its most relevant subdomain in the context of the question about the success of the hunt: the assessment about how successful it was. This second metonymy, which is chained to the first, can be labeled ACTION FOR RESULT. There is an underlying principle, called the Correlation Principle, which, in its application to metonymy, leads speakers to select the most relevant source domain in terms of its potential to afford access to the intended target domain. The implicit premises in the two reasoning schemas are constructed on the basis of this principle, which makes them adequate source domains for their metonymic targets, which are the implicated conclusions.
Conceptual integration can take three forms: (i) subsumption, which consists in building lexical-predicate structure into argument structure constructions (e.g. laugh can be subsumed into the intransitive construction in He laughs a lot, but also into the caused-motion construction, as in The child was laughed out of the school yard; cf. Ruiz de ; (ii) amalgamation, which is a matter of combining either lexical-predicate structure or constructional structure belonging to the same descriptive level (e.g. the active and passive realizations of the transitive, resultative and caused-motion constructions; Ruiz de Mendoza & Gonzálvez, 2011); (iii) saturation, which realizes variables from either idiomatic or non-idiomatic constructional characterizations through lower-level representations (e.g.
Can You X, Please? realizes X with a predication arising from the argument-structure level).
Constraints of subsumption
Subsumption has been described in great detail in Ruiz de and Mairal & Ruiz de Mendoza (2009) . These papers spell out the main constraining factors on subsumption, which have been applied to a number of lexical classes and constructions in Pérez & Peña (2009 ), Peña (2009 ), Baicchi (2011 , and Galera & Ruiz de Mendoza (2012) . In this work, constraints on subsumption have been divided into internal and external. The former work on the basis of the compatibility between the conceptual characterizations of lexical predicates and argument-structure constructions. The latter are based on how lexical structure can be re-construed to make it fit into a non-lexical construction. Internal constraints can be further subdivided into two types: (i) constructional constraints on lexical structure; (ii) lexical constraints on the instantiation of constructional variables. We now discuss the different types of constraint.
There is widespread consensus among constructionists (cf. Michaelis, 2003; Goldberg, 2006) that constructional structure "coerces" lexical structure when there are discrepancies between the two. This phenomenon has been labeled coercion and it is regulated by the Override Principle, according to which the meaning of a lexical item is adapted to the meaning of the structure in which it is embedded. LCM proponents have argued (cf. Ruiz de Mendoza & Mairal, 2008: 378 ) that this principle is not specific enough to account for how coercion takes place.
In the LCM coercion is accounted for as a side effect of different kinds of construal of ICMs taking place at high levels of cognitive activity. To give some illustration, consider the 28 sentence The students all but giggled him out of the room 2 . The verb giggle is not causative, which means that its causative use in this sentence comes from somewhere else. In constructionist accounts, the assumption is that the caused-motion construction adds that meaning ingredient to the verb, which is thus adapted into this constructional requirement.
However, not any verb can be coerced in this way into the caused-motion construction. Both metaphor and metonymy allow us to reinterpret a scenario in such a way that the lexicalpredicate invoking it can be adapted into a construction whose event structure only shares with it partial structure. Metaphor and metonymy thus act as licensing factors on lexicalconstructional subsumption. 2 books.google.es/books?isbn=1257900315; accessed on August 27, 2012. 3 http://www.fictionalley.org/authors/elais/NTHG01a.html; accessed on August 27, 2012.
Internal constraints, by contrast, are not based on construal; they act as blocking factors.
There are vertical and horizontal internal constraints. The former kind regulates the way in which lexical structure is built into constructional structure on the basis of (high and lowlevel) conceptual compatibility. The latter kind deals with the combinatorial properties of lexical predicates; such properties determine the ability of constructional elements to be coinstantiated. Let us discuss some cases of both internal constraint types.
Vertical constraints
Lexical structure consists of low-level and high-level (i.e. event or logical structure) nonsituational specifications. Low-level structure is encyclopedic and is connected coherently in terms of networks of relations. For example, we know that a cat chases mice, that it has whiskers and a tail, that it purrs, and so on. Because of this, in default contexts, it is odd to say that a cat can become involved in actions that are implausible for cats: #My cat chased your elephant; #Your cat drives better than mine; #When will our cat stop braying? Since oddities of this kind arise from the nature of the lexical structure that is associated with the internal (or Ruiz de . In this metonymy, a causative accomplishment (causing someone to move along to a destination) is first presented as if it were an active accomplishment (someone moves along to a destination). This is the metaphor. Then, the active accomplishment, which is expressed linguistically, is made to stand for the causative accomplishment (since the actor is known to be the causer of his own motion to a place for a specific purpose). This is the metonymy, which has the function of highlighting the noncausal part of the event chain by making it implicit, although recoverable.
One last constraint to consider in this section is the Focal Compatibility Constraint. One of the differences in constructional behavior between the verb give and contribute arises from this constraint. While give can be used both in the dative and the ditransitive constructions (e.g. He gave the charity all his money/He gave all his money to the charity), contribute is only possible with the dative (He contributed all his money to the charity; cf. *He contributed the charity all his money). Contribute involves the existence of multiple donors to a common fund. In fact, this predicate highlights the existence of multiple donors over the object and the recipient of the contribution. While the dative construction is compatible with such focal prominence factor, the ditransitive is not. This is so because the ditransitive construction focalizes the possession relationship between the recipient and the given object. This clash between lexical and constructional focal requirements blocks out subsumption of contribute into the ditransitive construction.
Horizontal constraints
There are three such constraints. The first two have been described in Ruiz de . The third one, which derives from work on constructional behavior carried out In this case, the co-instantiation of the predicate ('drive') and the PP slot ('into despair') calls for a human Y argument. Consider I found John an efficient plumber versus *I found John a plumber. The verb find, as used in this construction, calls for an evaluative element as the predicate complement of its object.
Amalgamation
Amalgamation is a level-internal process. It can have a lexical function. For example, through amalgamation it is possible to combine lexical items to one another thus giving rise to lexical construction. It subsumes the verb be into an argument-structure predicative construction that can further be optionally amalgamated with a to-PP.
Saturation of constructional variables
A constructional variable is an empty slot in a construction that requires saturation by a conceptual construct denoting an entity or a state of affairs that is construed as if it were an entity. Saturation can take place either through lexical mechanisms (e.g. the first participant in 
Meaning construction, meaning interpretation and formal expression
Despite its focus on "meaning construction" the LCM does not exclude considerations of formal expression including the syntactic arrangement of utterances. In fact, the LCM has made provision for the projection of semantic structure into syntax through its argument structure characterizations, as we have already noted. The notion of meaning construction does not exclude interpretation issues either. Thus, in specifying how meaning representations are created and expressed through formal structure in contexts of use, the LCM also gives an indirect account of how linguistic interpretation takes place. This does not mean that putting thoughts into linguistic expressions and deriving thoughts from linguistic expressions are exactly converse processes. What it means is that there is mutual feedback between the two:
formal expression in language is the result of realizing conceptual representation; helping hearers to construct an intended conceptual representation is, in turn, the goal of specific Following up on the basic distinction that we have made between idiomatic and non-idiomatic constructions, we can distinguish two cases of formal realization: idiomatic and nonidiomatic. The former involves no special discussion since it is highly fixed. Its variable elements, when they are present, once saturated from a meaning perspective, are realized on the basis of non-idiomatic formal expression, which will be the concern of this section.
Non-idiomatic formal expression is a matter of, first, morphological and phonological/graphic realization, and, second, of syntactic arrangement as specified in the form part of integrated lexical and constructional templates. We shall not address phonological realization, since we assume that, except in the case of meaning-carrying suprasegmental phonology (e.g. stress patterns and intonational contours, which are themselves constructional thus being the object of constructional amalgamation with idiomatic constructions at the implicational, illocutionary and discourse levels), segmental phonology, like graphic representation, is not constructional per se.
The LCM recognizes the descriptive adequacy of postulating constructional templates (or schemas) explicitly coupling semantic and pragmatic meaning with a specification of morphological and syntactic patterns, as is done in RRG (e.g. Van Valin & La Polla, 1997; Van Valin, 2005 ; see also the developments in Diedrichsen, 2011 , Nolan, 2011 , and Jiménez & Luzondo, 2012 . For example, the English resultative construction, according to Van Valin (2005: 239) This constructional template or schema responds to many of the requirements for a meaning construction/interpretation account of the canonical English resultative. In its formal part, unlike other constructions like the be-passive, which has idiosyncratic passive verb morphology, the resultative has no specific morphological marking, but it has a special syntax where the undergoer NP is between two nuclei and only the first nucleus is a verbal predicate.
In its meaning part, there is an abstract semantic representation, which captures the causative and resultative aspects of the construction. Illocutionary force and focus structure are left unspecified. The pairing form and function is carried out by the ascription of semantic and syntactic roles to the two nuclei.
There are, however, some essential differences with the LCM treatment of constructional templates. The first difference concerns the illocutionary and discourse values, which in the LCM are obtained though cued inferencing or subumption into levels 3 and 4 of its architecture. The second is that the LCM, as is evident from our discussion in section 4.2, provides a richer semantic specification for constructional templates. Thus, the meaning part of the resultative template takes into account several non-trivial facts about resultative constructions: (i) the instrumentality of the action is given conceptual prominence, which is captured by the amalgam of constructional functions INVOLV1MEANSe1; (ii) the actor's action can be intense enough to achieve the desired outcome, as captured by the optional intensifying function MAGN; (iii) the resultant state is the end-point of a process, which is captured by the primitive BECOME in connection to the resultant state. These facts are present in the description given in 4.2, which we repeat here for convenience: 
Conclusion
This paper has given an overview of the contribution of the LCM to our understanding of meaning construction, meaning interpretation and formal expression. It has placed emphasis on the role of constructional meaning in this process, while making critical revisions of other constructionist accounts of language in use, whether cognitivist or functionalist. In so doing, it has gone beyond the frequency criterion to determine whether a form-meaning paring can be considered a construction; in its place, it has posited the notion of replicability, which allows the analyst to give constructional status to non-frequent form-meaning pairings provided that they can be felt by competent native speakers as not doing violence to the nature of the language to which the construction belongs. The paper has also argued that verbal meaning is always projected into syntax through constructional meaning. This leads to a view of compositionality that is markedly different from the one in Langacker's Cognitive Grammar: meaning is not composed by means of assemblies of concepts, but rather by making use of the conceptual scaffolding provided by constructions. Then, the paper has discussed the architecture of the LCM in terms of the kinds of cognitive models that it exploits in order to make meaning, and it has described this process from the point of view of the descriptive and explanatory tools of the LCM. It has thus dealt with processes such as subsumption, amalgamation, and saturation of variables, while discussing the specific role of each process at the various descriptive levels of the model. Finally, it has related formal expression to meaning representation in terms of idiomatic and non-idiomatic constructions.
In this connection it has specified the requirements for full formal expression and related them to the format of constructional templates in the LCM.
